The computational study of elections generally assumes that the preferences of the electorate come in as a list of votes. Depending on the context, it may be much more natural to represent the list succinctly, as the distinct votes of the electorate and their counts. We consider how this succinct representation of the voters affects the computational complexity of election problems. Though the succinct representation may be exponentially smaller than the nonsuccinct representation, we find only one natural case where the complexity increases, namely the complexity of winner determination for Kemeny elections. This is in sharp contrast to the case where each voter has a weight, where the complexity usually increases.
Introduction
Elections are an important and widely used tool for determining an outcome given the preferences of several agents. Unfortunately, an important negative result from socialchoice theory, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem states that every reasonable election system is manipulable [Gib73, Sat75] . However, even though every reasonable election system is manipulable, it may be computationally infeasible to determine if a manipulation is possible. Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT89] started the computational study of the manipulation problem and later introduced the study of a family of manipulative attacks, denoted control, which models the actions of an election chair with control over the structure of the election and wants to ensure his or her preferred outcome [BTT92] .
In most of the computational studies on elections, the preferences of the voters are represented as a list of votes. Though this may be a reasonable representation for paper ballots in political elections, in artificial intelligence applications a more succinct representation where the preferences of the electorate are represented as a list of distinct votes and their counts may be more natural. For example, this representation is used by the online preference repository PrefLib for election data [MW13] .
We consider how this succinct representation of the votes can affect the complexity of different election problems, and contrast this with the case of weighted voters.
Though the succinct representation may be exponentially smaller than the nonsuccinct representation, we find that in surprisingly few cases the complexity increases. Related work that considers succinct votes did not find a case where the complexity increases [FHHR09, FHH09, HHR09, FHHR11] . We explain this phenomenon by showing that many common proof techniques that show that election problems are in P can be adapted to the succinct case (see Section 3) .
However, we also show that it is possible for the complexity to increase. For example, consider the following system X. Every voter votes by an approval vector (i.e., states an approval or disapproval for each candidate). A candidate wins if they are approved by exactly half of the voters. Though simple, this election system is not particularly natural. It has been chosen to show the increase in complexity: Consider the problem of constructive control by adding candidates (CCAC) for election system X. Given an election where the votes are represented succinctly, a set of unregistered candidates, and a preferred candidate p it is NP-complete to ensure that p wins the election using system X by adding unregistered candidates to the election. This is because this problem is basically subset sum, which is in P for unary numbers by dynamic programming and is NP-complete for binary numbers [GJ79] . (See Theorem 19 for a straightforward proof of this example. ) We found a natural case where the complexity increases. The complexity of determining the winner in a Kemeny election, which is well-known to be Θ p 2 -complete for the case of nonsuccinct votes [HSV05] , is ∆ 
Preliminaries
A (nonsuccinct) election is defined as a finite set of candidates C, and a list of voters V , where each voter v ∈ V has a preference order over the candidates. In a succinct election V is not a list of voters, but instead a list of distinct votes v (preference orders) and their positive integer count κ(v). In a weighted election V is still a list of voters, but now each v ∈ V has an associated positive integer weight ω(v), and can be thought of as a coalition of ω(v) voters all voting the same. It is important to note that weights are indivisible, while the counts in a succinct election are not. We assume that the preference order of each voter is a total order, i.e., he or she strictly ranks each candidate from most to least preferred.
An election system E maps an election to set of winners, where the winners can be any subset of the candidate set. The problem E-Winner is defined below.
Name: E-Winner
Given: An election (C, V ) and a candidate p ∈ C.
Question: Is p a winner of (C, V ) using election system E?
In the succinct case, E-Succinct-Winner, V is represented succinctly, and in the weighted case, E-Weighted-Winner, each voter has a corresponding positive integer weight.
A scoring vector α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α m , α i ≥ α i+1 defines an election system over m candidates. Each candidate receives α i points for each vote where they are ranked ith, and the candidate(s) with the highest score win.
A pure scoring rule defines a family of scoring vectors where the m-candidate scoring vector can be computed in polynomial time in m, and the m + 1-candidate scoring vector can be obtained from the m-candidate scoring vector by adding a single coefficient [BD09] .
Manipulative Actions
We examine the complexity of the following manipulative actions on elections. For each problem, we present the definition for the nonsuccinct case, and describe how the succinct and weighted cases differ.
Manipulation is the most widely studied manipulative action on elections. The computational study of manipulation was introduced by Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT89] , and was later extended for the coalitional, destructive, and weighted cases by Conitzer, Sandholm, and Lang [CSL07] . We present the definition of constructive unweighted coalitional manipulation (CUCM) below.
Name: E-CUCM
Given: A set of candidates C, a list of nonmanipulative voters V 1 , a list of k manipulators V 2 , 1 and a preferred candidate p ∈ C.
Question: Is there a way to set the preferences of the manipulators so that p is a winner of the election (C, V 1 ∪ V 2 ) using election system E?
The weighted case (CWCM) is essentially the same definition as above, except each of the voters (both the nonmanipulators and the manipulators) have an associated positive integer weight. In the corresponding succinct case, the nonmanipulator votes are represented succinctly, and the manipulators are represented as k encoded in binary.
Electoral control denotes the family of manipulative actions that consider an agent with control over the structure of the election, called the election chair, who wants to ensure his or her preferred outcome [BTT92] . Below we define constructive control by adding voters (CCAV), which is a very natural case of control and can be thought of as modeling get-out-the-vote drives.
Name: E-CCAV
Given: A set of candidates C, a list of registered voters V , a list of unregistered voters U , an add limit k ∈ N, and a preferred candidate p ∈ C.
Question: Does there exist a list U ′ of unregistered voters U ′ ⊆ U such that U ′ consists of at most k unregistered voters and p is a winner of (C, V ∪ U ′ ) using election system E?
In the standard model of weighted voter control the parameter k denotes the number of weighted voters the chair can add/delete [FHH15] . In the succinct case, the only change from the E-CCAV definition above is that the voters (registered and unregistered) are represented succinctly.
Computational Complexity
We assume that the reader is familiar with the complexity classes P and NP. We also have several results concerning the complexity classes Θ 
Adapting Approaches
The general theme of this paper is that in surprisingly few cases, the complexity of election problems increases when we allow succinct representation. In this section we will discuss several common approaches used to show that election problems are in P (for the nonsuccinct case), and describe how they can be adapted for the case where voters are represented succinctly, sometimes straightforwardly and sometimes in a more complicated way.
In particular, we show how greedy approaches, limited brute-forcing, network flow, and edge matching/cover techniques can be adapted. To showcase these adaptations, we will show that the dichotomy result for constructive control by adding voters (CCAV) for pure scoring rules [HHS14] holds for the succinct case. Assuming P = NP, the following pure scoring rules are asymptotically the only cases where CCAV is in P, both for the nonsuccinct and the succinct case.
• α, β, 0, . . . , 0 , where α > β.
• t-Approval, 1 t , 0, . . . , 0 , where t ≤ 3.
• t-Veto, 1, . . . , 1, 0 t , where t ≤ 2.
• 2, 1, . . . , 1, 0 .
In contrast, all weighted cases are NP-complete, except triviality ( 0, . . . , 0 ), 1-approval (plurality), 2-approval, and 1-veto [FHH15, Lin12] .
The following case demonstrates the adaptation of greedy algorithms as well as how to handle limited brute-forcing.
Proof. We follow the proof from [HHS14] and show how to adapt this to the succinct case.
The proof shows that there is a constant ℓ such that it is never better to add ℓ voters that put p second than it is to add ℓ pairwise different voters that put p first (assuming that voters that rank the first two candidates identically also rank all other candidates identically). Let V 1 be the set of voters that put p first and let V 2 be the set of voters that put p second.
So, if p can be made a winner, p can be made a winner by adding at most ℓ voters from V 2 or in a way that does not leave ℓ pairwise different voters in V 1 unused.
In the first case, we can brute-force over all sets of V 2 voters of size ≤ ℓ. Add these voters. We are then left with the problem of checking whether we can add at most k ′ V 1 voters to an election to make p a winner, where k ′ is k minus the number of V 2 voters added. In Hemaspaandra et al. [HHS14] , this is done by brute-forcing over every j in {0, . . . , k ′ } and checking whether we can add j voters from V 1 to make p a winner. If we know j, we know what the score of p after control will be, and so the last part can then be done greedily, by for each candidate adding as many voters that put a second as possible one voter at the time (until we have added j voters total).
We have two problems in the succinct case. The first is that we cannot in polynomial time brute-force over all possible values of j, since k ′ is not polynomially bounded. The second problem is that we don't have the time to add voters one at the time. The second problem can of course easily be fixed by, for each candidate a, adding as many voters with a in second place as possible all at once: If s a is the initial score of a and fs p is the final score of p (note that fs p = s p + jα), we can add at most ⌊(fs p − s a )/β⌋ voters with a second.
To handle the first problem, note that we can formulate the problem as an integer linear program with one variable (j), namely, there is a j, 0 ≤ j ≤ k ′ such that
where v a is the number of voters in V 1 that rank a second. 2 This integer linear program can be solved in polynomial time by [Len83] .
It remains to show that the second case, where p can be made a winner in a way that does not leave ℓ pairwise different voters in V 1 unused can be determined in polynomial time in the succinct case.
For the nonsuccinct case, in Hemspaandra et al. [HHS14] , this case is handled by bruteforcing over all sets S of at most ℓ−1 candidates who are ranked second by unused V 1 voters, and then brute-forcing over all possibilities for these candidates, i.e., by brute-forcing over all functions u : S → {1, . . . , V 1 }. This way, we loop over all cases of adding V 1 voters. After adding the V 1 voters, we need to see if p can be made a winner by adding V 2 voters. This can be done in a similar way as adding the V 1 voters in the first case above.
In the succinct case, we can still loop over all sets S of at most ℓ − 1 candidates. We can not brute-force all functions u, but this will turn again into an integer linear program, this time with ℓ − 1 variables (for the u values) and one more variable to handle the V 2 voters similarly to how we handled the V 1 voters in the first case above. This integer linear program can be solved in polynomial time by [Len83] . ❑ Theorem 2 CCAV is in P for t-approval when t ≤ 3 and for t-veto when t ≤ 2 for succinct elections.
Proof. The results for 1-approval, 2-approval, and 1-veto follow via simple greedy algorithms that can easily be adapted to work in the succinct case. 3-approval-CCAV was shown to be in P by Lin [Lin12] using a reduction to Simple b-Edge Matching for Multigraphs. The essence of the reduction is that every unregistered voter of the form {p, a, b} > · · · (by which we mean a voter who gives a point to p, a, and b) corresponds to an edge (a, b) in the constructed multigraph. For every candidate c = p, c is a vertex in the graph and b(c) is the final score of p minus the initial score of c (i.e., the number of points that we can add to c while keeping c's score less than or equal to p's score). In the succinct case, we would have too many edges in the graph. However, Capacitated b-Edge Matching (for graphs where edges have integer capacities) is also in P. So, we simply set the capacity of edge (a, b) equal to the number of unregistered voters of the form {p, a, b} > · · · , and we let b(c) be the final score of p minus the initial score of c as previously.
Similarly, 2-veto-CCAV was shown to be in P by reduction to Simple b-Edge Cover for Multigraphs. In that reduction, every unregistered voter · · · > a > b corresponds to an edge (a, b) in the constructed multigraph. Again, we can modify this construction to a reduction to Capacitated b-Edge Cover, which is also in P, by letting the capacity of edge (a, b) be the number of unregistered voters · · · > a > b. ❑
Another common technique to show that election problems are in P is network flow.
Theorem 3 2, 1, . . . , 1, 0 -CCAV is in P for succinct elections.
Proof. The essence of the nonsuccinct proof is to (after some easy preprocessing) build a min-cost flow network. The capacities of the edges are computed from the scores of the candidates and the multiplicities of the voters and are polynomially bounded in the size of the input. In the succinct case, we can use the exact same network. The capacities are now binary integers, but min-cost network flow is still in P in that case. ❑
Dynamic Programming
There is one other common technique that is used to prove that election problems are in P. This is dynamic programming. As alluded to in the introduction, dynamic programming approaches do not generalize to the succinct case. This does not mean that the succinct case is not in P. For example, Hemaspaandra and Schnoor [HS16] show that for all pure scoring rules with a constant number of different coefficients, manipulation is in P. This is shown by dynamic programming. And this algorithm is not in P for the succinct case, not even for restricted versions of this problem. Of course, as just stated, we may not need dynamic programming. For example, it is immediate that plurality and veto can be easily solved in polynomial time, in the nonsuccinct and the succinct case. For a more involved example, for scoring rule 0, . . . , 0, −1, −2 , one can greedily put a candidate c = p with highest score in a −2 spot, and after filling all −2 spots, in a −1 spot. Note that this simple greedy algorithm does not directly generalize to the succinct case, since we do not have enough time to fill slots one-at-a-time.
Still, in this particular case it is not hard to see that the succinct case is in P: Greedily put a highest scoring candidate c = p in ⌊(score(c) − score(p))/2⌋ −2 spots (or in as many of those as available). After filling all −2 spots, fill the −1 spots.
Things quickly get more complicated though. And there is a clear limit to how far this will generalize, since Borda manipulation is NP-complete.
Still, we conjecture that all these manipulation cases are in P for succinct elections. Again, this is in contrast to the weighted case, which is in P only for triviality and plurality. This holds even for fixed numbers of candidates, as explained in the next section.
Fixed Number of Candidates
It is reasonable to assume that the number of candidates in an election may be fixed. For the case of weighted voters many problems are hard, even when the number of candidates is fixed.
Theorem 4
1. m-candidate α-CWCM is NP-complete for every scoring rule α that is not plurality or triviality [HH07] .
m-candidate α-CC
A D V is NP-complete for every scoring rule α = α 1 , . . . , α m , when α 1 , . . . , α m ≥ 3, for weighted elections [FHH15] .
Faliszewski et al. [FHH09] showed that for succinct votes that manipulation is in P for any fixed number of candidates by describing an integer linear program with a fixed number of variables. A similar approach can be used to show that for succinct votes, constructive control by adding/deleting voters is in P for every scoring rule for a fixed number of candidates. Details can be found in the appendix. 
Kemeny Elections
Kemeny elections were introduced in [Kem59] . It is the unique election system that is neutral, consistent, and Condorcet [YL78] . A candidate p is a Kemeny winner if p is ranked first in a Kemeny consensus. A Kemeny consensus is a linear order > over the candidates that minimizes the Kendall's tau distance to V , i.e., that minimizes a,b∈C,a>b
where > v is the preference order of voter v.
Observation 7 Kemeny-Weighted-Winner is equivalent to Kemeny-Succinct-Winner.
Notice that the above observation holds since we do not modify the votes to score the election. This is not the case for Dodgson and Young elections, which we will discuss later in the section.
The Kemeny score of a candidate c is the minimum value of the Kendall's tau distance of all linear orders over the candidates that rank c first. And so p is a Kemeny winner if and only of p has a lowest Kemeny score.
Name: Kemeny-Score
Given: An election (C, V ), a candidate c ∈ C, and an integer k.
Question: Is the Kemeny score of c at most k?
Kemeny-Score was shown to be NP-complete and Kemeny-Winner was shown NP-hard by a reduction from feedback arc set in [BTT89] . Kemeny-Winner was shown Θ p 2 -complete in [HSV05] . Membership in Θ p 2 is easy: Simply compute the Kemeny scores of all candidates with one round of parallel queries to Kemeny-Score and check that p's score is the lowest. Kemeny-Winner was shown to be Θ Simply compute the Kemeny scores of all candidates using binary search on queries to Kemeny-Weighted-Score (which is in NP) and check that p's score is the lowest). We will now show that Kemeny-Succinct-Winner (and KemenyWeighted-Winner) are in fact ∆ Proof. This follows by careful inspection and modification of the proof from [HSV05] . In particular, since that proof consists of a chain of three reductions between Θ p 2 -complete problems, we need to define suitable ∆ By negating the variables in the formulas, we obtain the following ∆ p 2 -hard promise problem. 3 Name: MINSATASG = Given: Two satisfiable 3cnf formulas φ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) and ψ(x 1 , . . . , x n ).
Question: Do φ and ψ have the same lexicographically minimal satisfying assignment (viewed as an n-bit string)?
It is convenient to introduce the following intermediate ∆ Given: Vertex-weighted graphs G and H such that ω(G) = ω(H), where ω(G) denotes the weight of the graph.
Question: Is the weight of G's minimum-weight vertex cover equal to the weight of H's minimum-weight vertex cover?
We will show that MINSATASG = reduces to Weighted-Min-Card-Vertex-CoverEquality and that Weighted-Min-Card-Vertex-Cover-Equality reduces to Weighted-MinCard-Vertex-Cover-Compare, which proves Lemma 10.
Let φ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) and ψ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) be two satisfiable 3cnf formulas. Without loss of generality, assume that φ and ψ have the same number m of clauses (simply pad).
Let f (φ) be the graph computed by the standard reduction from 3SAT to Vertex-Cover from [Kar72] . Then f (φ) consists of 2n + 3m vertices:
, and the following edges: {x i , x i } for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and if the jth clause in φ is ℓ 1 ∨ℓ 2 ∨ℓ 3 , where ℓ r ∈ {x i , x i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, then we have edges {a j , ℓ 1 }, {b j , ℓ 2 }, {c j , ℓ 3 }.
The properties of f that we need here, which follow immediately from the proof of [Kar72] , are as follows.
1. f (φ) does not have a vertex cover of size less than n + 2m.
2. If W is a vertex cover of size n + 2m, then W ∩ {x i , x i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} corresponds to a satisfying assignment of φ, in the sense that W ∩ {x i , x i } = 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and α 1 · · · α n defined as α i = 1 if and only if x i ∈ W is a satisfying assignment for φ.
3. If α is a satisfying assignment for φ, then there is a vertex cover of size n + 2m such that W ∩ {x i , x i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} corresponds to this assignment, i.e., the set {x i | α i = 1} ∪ {x i | α i = 0} can be extended to a vertex cover of size n + 2m by adding 2m vertices from
Now set the weights of the vertices as follows: ω(a i ) = ω(b i ) = ω(c i ) = 2 n , ω(x i ) = 2 n + 2 i−1 , and ω(x i ) = 2 n . Note that for W a set of vertices, W = ⌊ω(W )/2 n ⌋. In particular, a minimum-weight vertex cover will also have minimum size.
We will now show that n-bit string α is the smallest satisfying assignment of φ if and only if f (φ) has a minimum-weight vertex cover of weight (n + 2m)2 n + α. (We interpret n-bit string α as a binary number between 0 and 2 n − 1.)
If α is a satisfying assignment for φ, then by property 3 above the set {x i | α i = 1} ∪ {x i | α i = 0} can be extended to a vertex cover of size n + 2m by adding 2m vertices from {a i , b i , c i | 1 ≤ i ≤ m}. The weight of this vertex cover is (n + 2m)2 n + α. Since the minimum size of a vertex cover is n + 2m, the weight of a minimum-weight vertex cover is (n + 2m)2 n + β, for some β such that 0 ≤ β < 2 n . Such a β corresponds to a satisfying assignment by property 2 above.
Since ψ is also a satisfiable 3cnf formula over x 1 , . . . , x n with m clauses, it also holds that n-bit string α is the smallest satisfying assignment of ψ if and only if f (ψ) has a minimum weight vertex cover of weight (n + 2m)2 n + α.
This then implies that φ and ψ have the same minimal satisfying assignment if and only if f (φ) and f (ψ)'s minimum-weight vertex covers have the same weight. Note that ω(f (φ)) = ω(f (ψ)). This completes the reduction from MINSATASG = to Weighted-MinCard-Vertex-Cover-Equality.
It remains to show that Weighted-Min-Card-Vertex-Cover-Equality reduces to Weighted-Min-Card-Vertex-Cover-Compare. This is straightforward. Given two vertex-weighted graphs G and H such that ω(G) = ω(H), map this to the following two vertex-weighted graphs (+ denotes the disjoint union and × denotes the join of two graphs).
1. G = X + G + H, where X is a 2-vertex, 1-edge graph, where both vertices have weight 2ω(G).
H = (G × H) + (G × H).
Note that ω( G) = ω( H). Let mvc be the minimum vertex cover weight of a vertexweighted graph. Then
min(mvc(G), mvc(H)). It follows that mvc(G) = mvc(H) if and only if mvc( G) ≤ mvc( H). ❑
This completes the proof of the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 11 Kemeny-Weighted-Winner and Kemeny-Succinct-Winner are
[DKNS01] shows that Kemeny-Winner is already NP-hard if we have four voters. In fact, one can easily combine the techniques from [HSV05] and [DKNS01] to obtain the following theorem. Details can be found in the appendix.
Theorem 12 Kemeny-Winner for four voters is
Do we get the same complexity jump if we look at the succinct and weighted case for four votes? Note that for the succinct case we allow many voters with the same vote, and so the Kemeny scores can be large. However, even though the scores can be large, it is easy to see that for each instance there are only a polynomial number of possible scores for each candidate, namely, if the multiplicities of the four votes are k 1 , k 2 , k 3 , and k 4 , the only possible scores are ℓ 1 k 1 + ℓ 2 k 2 + ℓ 3 k 3 + ℓ 4 k 4 , where 0 ≤ ℓ i ≤ C ( C − 1)/2. For each candidate, simply query the Kemeny-Weighted-Score oracle for all these possible scores in parallel, and then determine whether p has the highest score. The Young score of a candidate c is defined as the minimum number of voters that need to be deleted in order to make c a weak Condorcet winner. The Dodgson score of a candidate c is the minimum number of switches between adjacent candidates in voters such that c becomes a Condorcet winner. The candidates with the lowest scores are the winners. Unlike Kemeny, these winner problems depend on a modification of the votes, and so the succinct case and the weighted case do not coincide. In addition, one has to carefully think about what the weighted winner problem means: Do we charge by the voter (in analogy to the definition of weighted control) or do we charge by voter weight.
Clearly, by brute-force, we have the following. The succinct case for Young winner is also in P, but this seems to need much more powerful machinery. So, though this is not a complexity jump from tractable to intractable, it seems to be a jump in the complexity of the algorithm.
Theorem 16 For a fixed number of votes, Young-Succinct-Winner is in P.
Proof. Let v 1 , . . . , v ℓ be the different votes. Then the Young score of c is at most k if and only if there exist k 1 , . . . , k ℓ such that k i ≤ κ(v i ) and c is a weak Condorcet winner in the election system consisting of κ(v i ) − k i votes v i . All this can be formulated as an integer linear program with ℓ variables, which can be solved in polynomial time by [Len83] . ❑ For the general weighted cases where we charge by the voter, it is easy to see that the scores are polynomially bounded, and so we get. We do not think that this "lifting" will work for the succinct case and leave the exact complexity of Young-Succinct-Winner and Dodgson-Succinct-Winner, which we know to be Θ 
Conclusions and Future Work
Overall, we found that when we allow succinct representation of the voters that the complexity of election problems rarely increases.
There are several interesting directions for future work. In the cases we found where the complexity increases when moving to a succinct representation, the weighted and succinct problems were equivalent. Will this always be the case? Also, what is the exact complexity of Young-Succinct-Winner and Dodgson-Succinct-Winner?
A Appendix
Consider the following election system X. Every voter votes by an approval vector (i.e., states an approval or disapproval for each candidate). A candidate wins if they are approved by exactly half of the voters.
Theorem 19 X-CCAC is in P and X-Succinct-CCAC is NP-complete.
Proof.
This problem is basically subset sum, which is in P for unary numbers and NP-complete for binary numbers [GJ79] . To show that X-CCAC is in P, let s 1 , . . . , s m be the approval scores of candidates c 1 , . . . , c m , let the c 1 be the preferred candidate and let c 1 , . . . , c ℓ be the registered candidates. We want to know if there exists a subset I of {ℓ + 1, . . . , m} of size at most k such that
This can easily be computed in polynomial time, using dynamic programming. Simply let,
if and only if there exists a size-k ′ subset I of {ℓ + 1, . . . , m} such that 1≤i≤ℓ s i + i∈I s i = t. This can be done in polynomial time, since there are only polynomially many i, k ′ , and t to consider.
When the input is given succinctly, there are exponentially many values for t possible. In this case, we can prove NP-completeness. Membership in NP is immediate. We reduce from Partition: Given m positive integers k 1 , . . . , k m that sum to 2K, we need to determine if a subset of these integers sums to K. We will have m + 1 candidates, preferred candidate p and candidates c 1 , . . . , c m . We have K voters that approve of only p, and k i voters that approve of only c i . p is the only registered voter and the addition limit is m. It is immediate that there is a subset of k 1 , . . . , k m that sums to K if and only if p can be made a winner by adding candidates. ❑
A.1 Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. Given a set of candidates C, a list of registered votes V , a list of unregistered votes U , an addition limit k ∈ N, and a preferred candidate p ∈ C we can determine if the chair can ensure that p wins in polynomial time. The argument closely follows the approach used by Faliszewski et al. [FHH09] to show that m-candidate α-bribery and m-candidate α-CUCM, for every scoring rule α are each in P for succinct elections. We describe an integer linear program with a fixed number of variables, which due to the result from Lenstra Jr. [Len83] , can be solved in polynomial time.
Since the number of candidates m is fixed, we know that only m! different preference orders are possible. We list these preference orders in order in the following way: o 1 , . . . , o m! . For 1 ≤ i ≤ m!, let k i be the number of voters in V with preference order o i , and let k ′ i be the number of voters in U with preference order o i . Let x 1 , . . . , x m ! be variables. The constants used as input to our linear program are the coefficients of the scoring vector α 1 , . . . , α m , the counts for the registered voters k 1 , . . . , k m! , the counts for the unregistered voters k ′ 1 , . . . , k ′ m! , and the addition limit k. We have the following constraints. We first need to ensure that all of our variables have a positive value. So, ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m ! ,
We also need to ensure that no more than the number of unregistered votes of each type are added. So, ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m!, x i ≤ k ′ i . The following constraint ensures that no more than k total votes are added.
Our final constraint ensures that no other candidate has a score greater than p. It is easy to see that the above constraints are satisfied if and only if it is possible to add at most k unregistered voters from U such that p wins.
The above integer linear program can be easily modified for the case of deleting voters. ❑
A.2 Proof of Lemma 9: Weighted-Min-Card-Vertex-Cover-Compare polynomial-time many-one reduces to Kemeny-Succinct-Winner.
A. 
